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Abstract 
Previous research has shown the importance of Donald Trump’s Twitter activity, and that of his 
Twitter following, in spreading his message during the primary and general election campaigns 
of 2015-2016. However, we know little about how the publics who followed Trump and 
amplified his messages took shape. We take this case as an opportunity to theorize and test 
questions about the assembly of what we call “attentive publics” in social media. We situate our 
study in the context of current discussions of audience formation, attention flow, and hybridity in 
the United States’ political media system. From this we derive propositions concerning how 
attentive publics aggregate around a particular object, in this case Trump himself, which we test 
using time series modeling. We also present an exploration of the possible role of automated 
accounts in these processes. Our results reiterate the media hybridity described by others, while 
emphasizing the importance of news media coverage in building social media attentive publics.  
 
 
Keywords 
audience, attention economy, Twitter, hybrid media, media system 
 
  
The formation of attentive publics 2 
 
Acknowledgement 
The authors wish to thank Jennifer Stromer-Galley, Ralph Schroeder, participants in the 
workshop on “Order and disruption in the attention economy,” at the Weizenbaum Institute, 
Berlin, and anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this 
research. 
 
Introduction 
Assembling audiences has long been a primary concern of businesses, social movements and 
political actors. Advertising-driven media such as those dominant in the United States thrive or 
perish depending on their ability to attract eyeballs to be leased to advertisers (Webster & 
Phalen, 2013); social movements cannot effect social or policy change unless they attract the 
attention of publics and advocates (Gitlin, 2003; Freelon, McIlwain & Clark, 2016); and 
politicians effortfully stage public relations “information subsidies” to enter the news-making 
process and shape their representation in it (Gandy, 1982).  
The scramble to stitch together audiences has reached an epic scale in the contemporary 
“attention economy” (Goldhaber, 1997; Schroeder, 2018). There is correspondingly strong 
scholarly interest in the audience assembly processes of our current media system. Napoli 
(2011), for instance, showed how audience measurement figures increasingly in the making of 
media audiences. Webster (2014) has taken important theoretical steps, including building on 
structuration theory to describe the interplay between individual preference and the many forms 
of structure—social, technological, institutional—that shape potential audiences.  
Though much of the thinking about audience formation has emphasized macro-level 
formations, such as the distribution of attention across media outlets (e.g., Gentzkow & Shapiro, 
2011), it is no longer only large, traditional media entities that construct audiences; politicians, 
activists, celebrities and ordinary citizens employ a variety of tools like social media platforms to 
self-publish and garner attention independently (Karpf, 2016; Marwick, 2013; Tufekci, 2013). 
This unfolds in a hybrid media system, in which attention, transient and fluid, is the target of 
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competition between actors of unprecedented variety (Chadwick, 2013). There is much to learn 
about what kind of attention this diverse array of actors captures and how they build audiences 
who attend to them regularly in social media.  
A striking example of how audiences now assemble outside of journalistic media can be 
found in Donald Trump’s use of Twitter during his 2015-2016 presidential campaign. Trump’s 
use of Twitter afforded him an unfiltered channel with which to communicate with followers, as 
well as a mouthpiece that was assiduously attended to—and amplified—by news media. In this 
study, we expand our understanding of both the Trump phenomenon and general dynamics of 
contemporary audience formation by examining how Trump’s Twitter following came to be: the 
processes that contributed to the four-fold growth of his follower count during the campaign. 
We begin by reviewing contemporary work on the nature of audiences and publics in the 
hybrid media system. Conceptualizing social media following as a form of information structure 
that individuals personalize, we next develop a set of propositions about the factors that enhance 
the development of social media followings, which we conceptualize using the term attentive 
public. We then test the propositions with a 511-day time series analysis of the aggregation of 
Trump’s Twitter following, supplemented by one case analysis of a moment of rapid growth. 
Throughout, our aim is to provide an account of how attentive publics coalesce around an object 
(such as a person, company or cause) and how that formation is shaped by the logics of the 
hybrid media system. 
Structure, preference and hybrid media audiences 
Modern consumers of media enjoy a fantastic array of options from which to choose 
(Heeter, 1985; Webster & Phalen, 2013). Under these circumstances, individuals have the 
opportunity to construct personalized “media repertoires” of consumption by mixing and 
matching sources according to preference (Van Rees & Van Eijck, 2003). This flourishing of 
personal choice in media exposure has been described from a number of perspectives (e.g., Prior, 
2007).  
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While recognizing the growing agency of media consumers to select among offerings, 
however, we must not overlook structural factors that also affect media choices: audience 
members are still embedded in particular media structural environments, as well as the routines 
and habits of daily life (Kim, 2016; Taneja, Webster, Malthouse & Ksiazek, 2012).  
So, on what basis are audiences formed? The aggregation of many personal preferences, 
or larger structures? Webster (2014) has addressed the structure/agency dilemma underlying 
contemporary media choice using Giddens’ (1986) Structuration framework. To summarize his 
account, major structures involved in this system include producers of media content, the 
“architecture of distribution systems” of that content (Webster, 2014, p.131), the realities of 
life—“work, leisure, commute, and sleep”—that determine when people are available for media 
exposure, the media choices of their social groups, and so on (Taneja et al., 2012, p. 964). These 
structures create predispositions for content exposure that yield consumption patterns in interplay 
with individuals’ preferences. Then, crucially for the structurational aspect of this model, by 
reading the preferences audiences express through their consumption selections, the next 
iterations of media—the structures and their products—are formed. In this way, the influence of 
both media structures and consumers’ agency are accommodated (Webster, 2014). 
This interplay between preference and structure unfolds vividly on social media. In 
typical social media platforms, users express preferences by choosing to attend to particular 
items of information by reading, clicking links, “liking” and sharing (boyd & Ellison, 2007).  
Those preferences then become signals that are recorded and displayed on platforms, providing 
metrics for users, publishers (e.g., news organizations), political campaigns, advertisers and 
platforms themselves, to use in designing the next round of content creation and distribution 
(Gillespie, 2011; Karpf, 2016; Napoli, 2014). 
While these signals are “read” by structures, users also purposefully shape their own 
information environments, most of all by choosing with whom and what to construct explicit 
links. Most social media provide this affordance in the form of some type of “following,” 
“friending” or “subscribing.” Notably, the preference-driven decision to “follow” an object is a 
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structural form over which the user has direct control, as it becomes an enduring connection 
between the user and an object that will shape the user’s future information experience. Though 
it is important to note that such a decision may derive from various types of specific 
preferences—from the desire to see certain content, to a desire to display an identity publicly— 
whatever their deeper origin, in social media, they produce the same structural link. This 
illustrates the structurational quality of the system in which preferences are transformed into 
structure (Webster, 2014).  
Between audiences and publics 
In aggregate, the choices of many individuals to attend to a particular object constitute 
audiences—especially when a structure like the following affordance exists to sustain that 
attention over time and space (Webster, 2014). Yet the insights of the structuration of public 
attention paradigm have not often been applied to understanding the construction of particular 
audiences. More often, audiences are treated broadly, in the sense of “mass” audiences tuning in 
to media content. This line of thought has been useful in asking questions about who prefers 
what content or channels, whether an individual sees any news, whether that news is politically 
heterogeneous, etc. (e.g., Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011; Heeter, 1985; Stroud, 2010). What this 
aggregate approach tells us less about is how particular audiences come to be. 
A contrasting line of research, often operating in the context of digital media-enabled 
collective action, brings us closer to this question (e.g., Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; boyd, 2011; 
Papacharissi, 2015). This work emphasizes connections or commonalities that interlinked 
individuals share, and often uses the word “publics,” rather than “audiences,” to reflect a sense of 
connectedness, shared purpose, and potential collective action (Livingstone, 2005). It points to 
some answers about what brings such publics together: networked publics have been portrayed 
as the products of new opportunities to mobilize in online space (Bimber, Flanagin & Stohl, 
2005; boyd, 2011), the products of online exchange and cultural production (Jenkins, 2006) or 
affective expressions in networked space (Papacharissi, 2015), and responsive to real-world 
events that impact their interests (Savage & Monroy-Hernández, 2015). Closest to our own 
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study, Tufekci (2013) develops the concept of “micro-celebrity networked activism” to explore 
how social movement activists develop online audiences and use them to frame the wider 
portrayal of their causes. 
Our investigation of the phenomena that served to aggregate Trump’s social media 
audience builds on these insights, while making no claim about the internal coherence of the 
“public” or “audience” we are studying. At the scale of a multi-million-member social media 
following, it is likely to be composed of a variety of publics and audiences (Zhang, Wells, Wang 
& Rohe, 2018). Correspondingly, we make no claim than an attentive public is equivalent to a 
supportive public. 
 Yet, any given set of followers do share one vital trait: all have made an explicit choice to 
make the followed entity’s messages part of their attentional horizon. We shall use the term 
attentive public to accommodate our agnosticism about the nature of such an audience, while 
emphasizing that attentive publics are paradigmatic of our contemporary media moment: they are 
products of a hybrid media system that combines the attention-seeking products of numerous 
media structures, networking platforms that enable entities to assemble relatively stable 
followings, the exercise of personal preferences by thousands of individuals, and the strategic 
actions of those who seek their own attentive audiences. It is this combination of factors in 
building an online audience that we explore below.  
The benefits of an attentive public 
Such an audience confers a number of benefits on its holder, as scholars have observed. 
First and most simply, social media followings enable direct access to the attention of an 
audience, without the intervention of traditional gatekeeping (Gainous & Wagner, 2014; 
Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff & van’t Haar, 2013; Parmelee and Bichard, 2011). This is critical 
in a communicative era in which attention is a scarce, and zero-sum, resource (Goldhaber, 1997; 
Schroeder, 2018). Once an attentive public is formed, its holder is its own media channel, able to 
directly communicate with the attentive public.  
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Second, beyond the audience to which they grant direct access, the visibility of attentive 
publics, as prominently displayed in social media metrics such as followings and retweets, and 
corresponding news stories, now represent the power and influence of the object to which 
attentive publics are attached (Marwick, 2013). This visibility serves as a heuristic cue for 
individuals, journalists, politicians, social media algorithms and others to perceive that object as 
potentially worthy of further attention or coverage (Fu, 2012; Messing & Westwood, 2014). 
Moreover, the attention of audiences can often be further mobilized by their exposure and 
readiness to amplify messages sent by the holder of attention (Tufekci, 2013). Importantly, this 
aspect of the attention economy is often agnostic to the nature of that attention—whether it is 
positive and supportive or critical. It is even agnostic as to whether the attention is paid by 
human or automated processes. To an entity “reading” the attention generated in quantitative 
terms, these distinctions may be lost in translation. 
Finally, the accumulation of attentive publics in networked media has the additional 
advantage that—thanks to the “Matthew effect” and algorithmic bias toward popularity—they 
are likely to grow: attention tends to attach or be directed to those objects that already enjoy 
previous attention (Webster, 2014).  
The assembly of attentive publics 
We have portrayed attentive publics as the products of aggregated individual preferences 
operating in the context of the structural features of social media. Given their significance to 
contemporary communication, we wish to know more about how they are formed. Interestingly, 
whereas a number of studies have examined how typical users’ social media followings come 
about (e.g., Hutto, Yardi & Gilbert, 2013; Martín, Lavesson & Doroud, 2014; Mueller & 
Stumme, 2017), we are aware of little previous research on the large-scale followings of public 
figures that correspond to the types of audiences of theoretical interest here. 
Helpfully, in Trump’s Twitter following, we are able to observe a kind of attentive public 
growing quickly between his campaign announcement (June 16, 2015) and Election Day 
(November 8, 2016). During this period, Trump’s Twitter following grew from around 3 million 
The formation of attentive publics 8 
 
to over 13 million. In this section, we derive several propositions about the preference 
expressions and structural factors likely to contribute to the growth of Trump’s attentive public.  
Social media amplification 
Connections between individuals’ preference expressions and information structures lie 
at the heart of the structuration framework. This leads us to consider to what degree social media 
amplification of Trump’s message—expressions of preference and support by users—
contributed to growth in his Twitter following—a form of structure within that platform. There 
are several reasons to expect such a relationship. First, greater retweets mean that Trump’s name, 
message and Twitter handle are being shared by more users, whose own followers may 
encounter and begin to follow Trump—“triad closure” (Myers & Leskovec, 2014). Additionally, 
observing that Trump’s tweets are being retweeted hundreds of thousands of times—via the 
metric indicators visible on each Tweet, Twitter users might find Trump worthy of attention and 
therefore follow him. There may be an affective component to this (Papacharissi, 2015), as users 
build on one another’s interest in choosing to follow an unusual candidate. Finally, Twitter itself, 
in an effort to increase user engagement, is likely to enhance the visibility of content receiving 
attention already (Gillespie, 2011).  
H1: High levels of retweeting of Trump will tend to be followed by growth in Trump’s 
Twitter following.  
News media 
Social media, however, are not isolated systems; factors outside the social media domain 
likely also contributed to Trump’s ability to draw and communicate with attentive publics there. 
Most of all, it has long been the case that political entities—candidates, parties, social 
movements—must become visible to and have a chance to speak to, publics; much of this 
visibility and legitimation comes from coverage in news media, a form of content production 
structure (Gitlin, 2003; Patterson, 2016). Research on inter-media agenda-setting reiterates the 
significance of “legacy” media, demonstrating that issue salience in online venues can be 
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transferred to traditional media and vice versa (Conway, Kenski & Wang, 2015; Neuman, 
Guggenheim, Jang & Bae, 2014).  
Connecting to our case, when Trump was frequently covered by mainstream press, the 
high issue salience might give rise to heightened interest in Trump, driving people to Twitter to 
follow him and observe his Twitter behavior first-hand. Therefore, we expect that moments of 
greater media coverage will lead to greater follow growth: 
H2: News media coverage of Trump will tend to be followed by growth in Trump’s 
Twitter following.  
 Trump enjoyed substantial news coverage regarding his campaign in general, and his use 
of Twitter specifically. The latter is especially significant given the frequency with which news 
now links directly to (“embeds”) Twitter messages in stories, leaving readers only a click away 
from a Twitter profile; thus, we distinguish and examine the two types of coverage separately 
below. 
Conventional information subsidies 
Strategic communication aims to increase the likelihood and favorability of attention and 
visibility of a campaign, especially as depicted in news media. The classic notion of an 
“information subsidy”—evocative visuals and quotations, for instance (Gandy, 1982)—reveals 
that campaigns achieve coverage by affecting structures’ cost/benefit calculations. It is worth 
asking in what ways these techniques translate from attracting traditional media attention to 
helping to assemble online attentive publics. 
We expect both traditional information subsidies such as rallies and press conferences, 
and the heightened attention surrounding “media events” such as debates and primaries (Dayan 
& Katz, 1992) will lead to growth in social media, in this case enhancing Trump’s attentive 
public. As Savage and Monroy-Hernández (2015) have shown, events related to a social media 
group but occurring “offline” can play an important role in activating attention around that group 
and drawing in new followers.  
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 H3: Traditional political campaign tactics will tend to be followed by growth in Trump’s 
Twitter following. 
H4: Election events will tend to be followed by growth in Trump’s Twitter following.  
Provocative/outrageous statements 
The content of social media messages may also be significant to audience development 
(Hutto et al., 2013). For Trump, a series of outrageous statements—outrageous in the sense that 
they violated norms concerning how politicians campaign for the presidency—stand out as a 
uniquely impactful form of content. These statements played into both the press’ desire for 
novelty and conflict, and the public’s desire for an entertaining angle to politics (Price and 
Tewksbury, 1996). They also often incorporated or expressed forms of righteous indignation or 
anger, an emotion known to be associated with political mobilization (Valentino et al., 2011), 
and a possible basis for an affective public (Papacharissi, 2015). Thus: 
 H5: Outrageous statements made by Trump will tend to be followed by growth in his 
Twitter following. 
On the problem of bots  
It is important to note that the ecosystem we are analyzing is made up not only of human 
actors, but also includes automated accounts designed for a variety of purposes, including 
influencing political outcomes (Metaxas & Mustafaraj, 2012; Woolley & Howard, 2016). In our 
case, those who retweeted Trump’s tweets or followed Trump might include automated accounts. 
The question of how automated accounts should be dealt with in empirical research is a 
significant one, and far from answered. In this section, we briefly present considerations 
concerning the challenges presented by automated accounts in social media.  
We first have definitional problems. The notion of a social media “bot” colloquially 
refers to a fully-automated account programmed to engaged in particular behaviors, such as 
producing particular messages. But this colloquial understanding obscures a more complicated 
reality. First, there is a continuum of automated-ness. Some human users have employed partial 
automation techniques or created other systems to incentivize high levels of social media activity 
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(Timber, 2017). And we know that in 2016, some Trump-supporting Twitter accounts were 
incorrectly identified as bots due to their high levels of formulaic activity (Musgrave, 2017). 
We may feel that such communications are inauthentic because they intentionally inflate 
a particular perspective, but it would be inappropriate to remove them from data as some kind of 
error. (The same is true of Russian IRA accounts, many of which were automated, many of 
which were not.) Rather, if we are interested in the operation of a communication system, it is an 
empirical project to understand how its many actors interact—as a whole and, when we are able 
to reliably disaggregate them, individually (cf. Salganik, 2016, 2.3.9).  
We offer several answers to how we should address this state of affairs in research. First, 
it is important to identify, distinguish, and study how different kinds of actors contribute to 
communicative dynamics. However, it is also important to trace the dynamics of the overall 
system, even when we are not perfectly proficient at disentangling its elements. We should not 
suspend all ability to build knowledge until such a point is reached, which in the case of bot 
detection will probably always be elusive (Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer, & Flammini, 2016; 
Subrahmanian et al., 2016). Instead, we should build knowledge with the data we have, 
accompanied by appropriate caveats about the limitations of our inferences.  
Moreover, to the extent that we as researchers have difficulty in identifying automated 
accounts, we have every reason to believe that others—users, news organizations, and platforms 
themselves—are also challenged. Automated behavior is well-integrated into the social media 
ecology; it blends with “organic” behavior in creating the kinds of effects our study analyzes. 
And to the extent that various actors are reading quantitative, aggregated signals of attention, 
whether those signals emanate from humans, or trolls, or bots, or something else, may not be 
material to their response (see McGregor & Molyneux, 2018 for evidence along these lines in the 
journalistic context).  
Addressing bots in our analysis 
 This discussion lends itself to several considerations in our analysis. First, our main 
contribution is in describing the overall activity of the social media system, not only the human 
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component of it—since, as we have just noted, this is a notion more complex than first appears. 
Second, we disaggregate daily retweets of Trump into separate time series based on whether they 
are created by handles that appear to be bots, or not bots, according to Botometer (Bessi & 
Ferrara, 2016).  
 Our study is limited in that we are not able to disaggregate our dependent variable, the 
growth in Trump’s Twitter followers, because it is impossible to accurately estimate when an 
account began following another: though retweets are time stamped, “follow” times are not 
recorded. It is possible to ascertain the order that accounts began following Trump, but given 
even a modest, unknown rate of unfollowing, suspension, etc., estimates of what day any given 
account began following Trump will be error-prone. 
 However, there are reasons to believe that this limitation does not cause systematic bias 
in our dependent variable. First, automated accounts may not play as large a role in Trump’s 
following as assumed. For example, when Twitter undertook one of its largest purges of 
apparently automated accounts, Trump’s following saw one of the smallest reductions reported. 
While his follower count fell by 340,000 (a drop of 0.64%), Obama saw a drop of 2.9%, and the 
following of Twitter’s handle dropped 12% (Jacobs, 2018). 
 Second, automated accounts would be most likely to affect our results if they begin 
following Trump in a nonrandom pattern (or they would only add statistical noise to our models), 
do so by patterns different from human followers (or their effect would be to strengthen existing 
findings), and are numerous enough to affect results. While research on the following behavior 
of automated accounts is too sparse for definitive predictions, we have little reason to think these 
conditions hold. In particular, what we can tell about bots’ behavior in the retweet series indicate 
that they look very much like all other accounts (see results below and Figure A4 in 
Supplementary Materials for graphical comparisons).1  
Method 
We employ quantitative time series analysis informed by close attention to key events during the 
primary and general election campaigns. Time series techniques are well-suited to analyzing 
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relationships among variables within a system because they allow us to establish time-order 
relationships while accounting for various forms of autocorrelation and confounding variables. 
Measures 
Trump followers 
We measure the number of Trump Twitter followers on every day between the day he 
entered the race (June 16, 2015) and Election Day (November 8, 2016) by collecting data from 
trackanalytics.com.2 We validated this series against a dataset collected by 
querying “@realDonaldTrump” in a 1% of Twitter archive drawn from the Twitter’s Streaming 
API and found 99% correspondence. 
Retweets of Trump per day 
We drew retweets of Trump from the same 1% archive mentioned above. We validated 
daily counts of retweets against a sample from Crimson Hexagon and found a correlation at r = 
.99. On several days in our study period, our data were incomplete due to lack of service from 
Twitter. Counts of retweets on these days were replaced by linear imputation in cases of two or 
fewer missing days; for two longer stretches, we used a vector autoregressive model of Trump’s 
retweet values to forecast the missing values. As a robustness check, we also tested the models 
with missing days removed and found nearly identical results. 
News coverage of Trump 
To measure the amount of coverage Trump received each day of the campaign, we used 
MediaCloud, a news archiving project (www.mediacloud.org), which draws on news outlets’ 
RSS feeds to create daily word counts for articles about Trump. We created three sets of news 
coverage of Trump: one from mainstream American media (New York Times, Washington Post, 
USA Today, CNN and CBS) one from establishment conservative sources (Fox News and the 
Wall Street Journal) and one from online conservative sources (Breitbart and the Daily Caller). 
In each case, we selected articles that mentioned “Trump” more than once. In the main results 
below, we present coefficients from the set of mainstream media; effects of other news sources 
were comparable and can be found in Supplementary Materials (see Note 1). 
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Finally, for each news outlet, we distinguished articles covering Trump’s use of Twitter 
by separating those articles that included “Twitter” or Trump’s Twitter handle, 
“@realdonaldtrump,” from all other articles in the set.  
Event timeline 
We constructed a catalog of events of the campaign, distinguishing two types of events. 
Trump campaign events were events that reflected traditional information subsidy activities of 
the candidate. These were campaign events, which includes rallies, town hall meetings, press 
conferences, interviews with media outlets (planned and unplanned), and other appearances (e.g., 
public meet and greets), and were represented in day-by-day counts. Election events were events 
in the larger election and were encoded in binary format. These included Trump’s campaign 
announcement, debates (Republican debates during the primary, and presidential and vice-
presidential debates during the general election), the dates on which top Republican challengers 
dropped out, and the date of Trump’s nomination acceptance speech at the Republican 
Convention.  
Outrageous statements: To develop a comprehensive and relatively non-biased timeline 
of outrageous statements made by Trump, we drew on numerous sources, consulting timelines 
and reporting from the Washington Examiner, Reuters, CNN, Newsday, NPR, USA Today and 
People. This yielded a timeline of Trump’s outrageous statements: we coded each day as 0 or a 1 
based on whether Trump did not make, or did make, such a statement. Clearly, such an 
assessment is prone to subjectivity on the part of the researcher. Nonetheless, we felt it was 
important to include such a measure to guard against omitted variable bias: we did not want 
variance explained in our models to be attributed to one of our variables, such as retweeting 
behavior, when it originated with a conceptually separate attention-driving technique on Trump’s 
part. (See complete list in Supplementary Materials.) 
Detection of automated accounts 
 To examine the separate contributions of retweets coming from likely bot accounts and 
those from likely human accounts, we disaggregated the retweet series. First, we identified the 
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accounts that retweeted Trump during our study period: in our sample, 140,822 unique accounts 
created 285,136 retweets. (As we are working with a 1% sample, this represents around 28.5 
million retweets.) Next, we used Botometer’s API to assess the 140,822 accounts.3 Some 
accounts could not be assessed by Botometer, as they were no longer on Twitter. For these 
errors, we accessed the account’s Twitter page and recorded the error, distinguishing between 
accounts that had been suspended by Twitter, were protected by the user—i.e., made private, or 
had been closed. For the accounts Botometer could access, Botometer provides probabilistic 
estimates of automation. We used Botometer’s “Universal Complete Automation Probability” 
score (CAP_Universal), and set a threshold at a conservative 0.25, partly because the rate of bot 
identification was so low that at a higher CAP_Universal our retweet counts became very sparse. 
Thus, we considered any account with a CAP_Universal over 0.25 to be a “likely bot.” 
<Table 1 about here> 
Table 1 presents descriptive results of this process, separated by the accounts with exactly 
one retweet in our sample (first row), and those with two or more retweets (second row), which 
show nearly identical distributions. Botometer returned assessments for about 75% of accounts; 
5% of accounts show higher than .25 CAP_Universal. However, an unknown number of 
suspended accounts are also bots, which Twitter since identified and suspended, and some closed 
accounts may also be. If we roughly estimate that all suspended accounts and none of the closed 
accounts are bots, we would guess that around 14% of unique accounts were bots, a portion in 
line with a previous Botometer estimate (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). However, a simple plot 
comparing Botometer’s assessments to estimates along the lines of Kollanyi and colleagues 
(2016) displays considerable divergence in classifications, suggesting caution when drawing 
conclusions from any technique of bot detection (see Supplementary Materials). 
Results 
We begin by illustrating the growth of Trump’s Twitter following between the beginning 
of 2015 and the end of 2016: Figure 1 does so by displaying daily raw follower count, while 
Figure 2 displays day-on-day percentage change in followers.  
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<Figure 1 about here> 
<Figure 2 about here> 
As Figure 2 makes clear, the growth of Trump’s Twitter following is a highly punctuated 
series, made up of a baseline level of growth and brief moments of dramatic increase. But such 
moments are “averaged out” in any regression analysis. Given the obvious importance of many 
of these moments, we separately identified and examined the ten days of greatest gain in 
Trump’s followers (see Table A1, Supplementary Materials). All but one of these moments of 
audience accumulation can be directly traced to at least one event that connects to our 
expectations of how attentive publics form: in concordance with our hypotheses, these include 
major focusing events, news media coverage, outrageous statements by Trump, and intense 
social media activity.   
The First Republican Debate 
The first Republican debate, which took place in August 2016, is an illustrative example, 
as it involved combinations of all of these factors and provided no fewer than three of the ten 
greatest days of Trump follower gain.  
The debate served as a major introduction for audiences to the Republican contenders, 
most of all Trump himself. Following the event’s conclusion, both traditional and social media 
focused on Trump, with many drawing attention to Trump’s incendiary rhetorical style and 
pointing specifically to a contentious exchange between Trump and moderator Megyn Kelly.  
 Soon, Trump began tweeting, targeting Kelly: “Wow, @megynkelly really bombed 
tonight. People are going wild on twitter! Funny to watch.” Trump’s messaging spurred another 
cycle of media attention, with outlets like USA Today and Washington Post quoting his tweets in 
stories and characterizing the incident as a late-night Kelly-slamming.  
 Trump continued to stoke the flames the next day, when he called in to CNN. Asked to 
address his exchange with Kelly, he said: “You could see there was blood coming out of her 
eyes. Blood coming out of her wherever.” Reiterating this sentiment in tweets, Trump claimed 
that “hundreds of thousands of people” agreed with his statement. News media jumped on 
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Trump’s controversial remark and post-hoc rationalization, frequently quoting his tweets in the 
process.  
 Coverage of this debate highlights how Trump’s attention-drawing stunts in traditional 
and social media combined and intersected. The episode began with a televised debate—a 
political spectacle drawing large social and traditional media audiences. This was followed by 
typical post-debate coverage, late-night Twitter remarks from Trump, and further coverage of 
those tweets. Trump then turned to cable news to make an outrageous statement, then amplified 
it in tweets, resulting in a further wave of coverage. All the while, Figure 3 shows, Trump’s 
Twitter following was accumulating, locking-in an audience for future messaging. 
Time series analysis 
We now turn to the quantitative examination of our hypotheses. Table 2 presents a series 
of Prais-Winsten regression estimates. This technique accounts for autocorrelation within our 
dependent variable.4 Operating under the assumption that media system effects are relatively 
fast, we use a one-day lag, which means that independent variables at day 0 are used to predict 
the outcome variable at day 1. We first estimate a sparse model (column 1), then build a more 
fully saturated model (column 3) to help delineate main and mediated effects. 
<Table 2 about here> 
We also use vector autoregression models (VARs), which fit a multivariate time-series 
regression of each endogenous variable on lags of itself and on lags of all other variables (see 
Sims, 1980). VAR specification and results can be found in Supplementary Materials. 
Our Prais-Winsten regression and VAR models converge in their findings. H1 is strongly 
supported: as Table 2 displays, retweets of Trump consistently predict growth in followers. 
When mainstream news media coverage of Trump is accounted for (Model 3), the coefficient is 
slightly weakened, suggesting a partial mediating process: retweets boosted his follower numbers 
both directly and through their impact on media attention to his Twitter behavior (Granger 
causality tests, presented in Supplementary Materials, support this interpretation).  
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To consider what contribution, if any, automated accounts made to the findings 
supporting H1, we created four new day-by-day time series of retweets per day: one each for 
accounts (a) with CAP_Universal scores <= .25; (b) with CAP_Universal scores > .25; (c) 
protected accounts; and (d) suspended accounts. We then re-ran our models with a series 
combining (a) and (c), which we presumed to be non-bots, and with a series combining (b) and 
(d), which we deemed to possibly be bots. Because they are highly correlated series, we entered 
them into separate models, displayed in Table 3.5 
<Table 3 about here> 
As Table 3 shows, the behavior of “likely bot” and “likely non-bot” accounts are nearly 
identical: they have comparable, significant effects on the dependent variable, and neither 
substantially changes the performance of other variables. In short, to the extent that we 
accurately identified bots, they appear to play a role comparable to that of “human” accounts. 
H2 is strongly supported as well, but only for news coverage about Trump and Twitter as 
a predictor of his gain in followers. Impulse response function plots indicate that both types of 
coverage precede growth in followers (see Supplementary Materials), but it is the effect of news 
about Trump and Twitter that survives inclusion in a model with covariates. It appears that the 
variance explained by general news coverage of Trump is better explained by other variables, 
such as election events and retweets, whereas news coverage of Trump and Twitter makes an 
independent contribution.  
We further considered the impact of partisan media, specifically right-wing media, in 
increasing Trump’s follower numbers. News coverage of Trump and Twitter in Fox News, the 
Wall Street Journal, Breitbart, and Daily Caller all provide additional positive coefficients above 
and beyond mainstream news, though not all are statistically significant when entered 
simultaneously in the model (see Supplementary Materials). In short, coverage in different types 
of media appeared to have largely the same impact on follower growth. 
When it came to campaign events, we found no support for the proposition (H3) that 
Trump-sponsored campaign events influenced the growth of followers, either directly or via 
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news media mediation. But election events were associated with follower growth for Trump 
(confirming H4)—reiterating the hybrid nature of a communication environment in which major 
media events (Dayan & Katz, 1992) continue to aggregate public attention. 
Our findings about H5, considering outrageous statements, reveal weak if any support for 
the hypothesis. The coefficients across the models in Table 1 are large and positive, but do not 
reach statistical significance (ranging from p = .076 in Model 1 to p = .330 in Model 3). Trump’s 
outrageous statements did not lead systematically to growth in followers—certainly not as 
consistently as news media and election events. However, the large coefficient and standard error 
may suggest that a subset of them were associated with follower growth. Interestingly, the full 
Vector Auto-Regression results (Supplementary Materials) also suggest that such statements 
were inconsistent predictors of news media attention, contrary to our intuitions. We suspect this 
may be because some of the highest-profile outrageous comments occurred in the midst of other 
election events, at which time other variables were already near their maximums—as was 
illustrated in the case of the “Megyn Kelly feud” discussed above. 
Discussion 
We have conceptualized the process of audience formation in social media as a product 
of social media affordances, individual preference expressions, and structural logics of the hybrid 
media system. We have depicted social media audiences as important to actors of social and 
political relevance today, as they confer the multi-faceted power that comes with the capacity to 
command regular attention, and to display that capacity to others. And our empirical analysis has  
offered a novel application of contemporary theory on hybrid media system audience formation 
to the development of a single, but uniquely successful and important attentive public: that of 
Donald Trump’s Twitter following. 
Our results demonstrate that, like the news attention he attracted (e.g., Wells et al., 2016), 
Trump’s attentive public developed from a combination of factors, including social media 
amplification, media exposure that highlighted his tweets, and prominent election events. The 
finding that social media activity, specifically retweets of Trump, contributed to the growth of 
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his following illustrates one aspect of the “duality” of the digital attention economy (Webster, 
2014). Viewing retweets as actions that express individual users’ preferences, we find that those 
retweets contributed to subsequent follower growth, illuminating a link between user preference 
and media structure: the choice to amplify Trump by some enhanced his visibility to others, 
some of whom chose to follow him, creating new structural links. The analogy of a sedimentary 
process may be appropriate here, as many individual user preferences accumulate to shape the 
emerging communication world. 
Further, to the extent that we were able to identify automated accounts, our results 
suggest that their retweets also led to other users beginning to follow Trump. This is one of the 
first time series analyses to compare the performances of automated and non-automated 
accounts, and our finding of their parity in driving follower growth is an important step in 
understanding bots’ contribution to the social media ecosystem (see also Zhang et al., 2019). 
Future research into the assembly of audiences in social media might seek to specify the 
mechanisms that drive this effect: as noted earlier, it could be the result of triad closure—the 
spread of an entity’s message to new audiences. But it could also involve structures that detect 
heightened attention to an entity: that is, it could work through Twitter’s algorithm, which seeks 
to promote “trending” topics as a way to keep broader audiences interested in the site. 
News media also figured in the development of Trump’s audience, though importantly it 
was news coverage that specifically covered Trump’s use of Twitter that played the significant 
role. There may be an underlying mechanism here in the practice of embedding tweets in news 
stories, which we saw many times in investigations of top days of follower gain: as news media 
strive to incorporate social media, their use of embedded tweets brought a you-are-there feeling, 
with Trump’s handle name and image alongside the tweet itself. They approximated quotes, 
creating an extension of Trump’s persona. Crucially, the functionality also made it easier to 
follow Trump, as readers could click embedded links and be directed to his Twitter handle 
page—and apparently did so in substantial numbers.  
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While this underscores the continuing influence of news media as a director of attention, 
from the perspective of gatekeeping in digital media (Vos & Heinderycx, 2015), there is also a 
profound irony: the gatekeepers enabled their own circumvention by directing audiences to 
channels in which audiences find unfiltered versions of newsmakers.  
Future research on attentive publics 
The punctuated linearity of the aggregation of Trump’s following that we found also 
deserves further attention. Outsized gains were made over periods of only a day or two, as 
Trump dominated headlines through periods of intense attention (cf. Boydstun, Hardy & 
Walgrave, 2014). Our results and case analyses reveal how deftly Trump recognized and 
exploited opportunities for attention. (Several of his greatest gains in Twitter following came 
about as a result of his self-insertion into events that were not about him, including a primary 
debate among candidates of the other party.) The importance of such moments to attention 
structures that then endure for months or years provides important temporal perspective for 
understanding the dynamics of the media system: they suggest that such moments can be 
influential for much longer than they themselves last. Future research might advance the “media 
storm” research paradigm (Boydstun et al., 2014) by examining more systematically how those 
storms leave sedimentary traces on the structure of audiences in social media. 
It is also reasonable to ask to what extent our findings are likely to replicate in other 
cases, i.e., in cases other than Trump. In fact, there is good reason to think we may be describing 
general features of hybrid media system audiences. First, the variable that most unique to Trump, 
his norm-breaking pronouncements, did not play as large a role as we expected; his ability to 
garner news media attention and retweets were much more important, as were election events.  
Whether other political actors garner this kind of attention in news and social media is of course 
a question with implications far beyond our purposes here; but the cross-media attention flow 
dynamics are probably present in many other circumstances. Within the political sphere, 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is now often compared to Trump for her facility with social media; 
future research on figures such as Ocasio-Cortez might productively apply our approach. Beyond 
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the electoral sphere, the concept of attentive publics may be useful to other studies of political 
communication, including activists (cf. Tufekci, 2013), social movements, and issue publics 
(Kim, 2009). In this respect, our study connects to related lines of work investigating how 
attention is aggregated around a particular issue or movement (Freelon et al., 2016). 
 A further question we are unable to address is how much attentive publics—or other 
social media-based conglomerations of attention—are in fact ‘publics,’ in the sense of having 
some degree of interlinked coherence, networked structure, or communication, as opposed to 
atomized ‘audiences’ akin to those of the mass media era. Our sense is that Trump’s Twitter 
attentive public was highly diverse and probably contained both public-like enclaves as well as 
millions of less engaged followers (Zhang et al., 2017). More systematically investigating what 
kinds of connections and activities underlie what are often referred to as “publics” is an 
important project for the study of contemporary audiences.  
Finally, it is important to return to our earlier discussion of how we deal with automated 
accounts. Most of all, like any research examining social media data, we must recognize that our 
limited ability to identify automated accounts—or detect them accurately—constitutes a 
limitation. This demonstrates the need for continuing attention to the prevalence of automated 
accounts in social media, and to the importance of understanding how they do or do not behave 
similarly to other categories of accounts. Our results did not indicate that likely-bot accounts 
operated any differently from unlikely-bots in amplifying Trump’s tweets, but we were not able 
to make such an assessment when it came to patterns of following Trump. This highlights the 
need for more attention to that particular aspect of bot behavior.  
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Notes 
1. Supplementary Materials can be found at: 
https://osf.io/d8ytr/?action=download%26mode=render  
2. http://www.trackalytics.com/twitter/followers/widget/realdonaldtrump/  
3. Botometer is described by its creators as “a machine-learning framework that extracts and 
analyzes … over one thousand features, spanning content and network structure, temporal 
activity, user profile data, and sentiment analysis” (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). See details of the 
Botometer API at: https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/#!/api 
4. Note that we first-difference the Trump follower count variable. This was done to induce 
stationarity in the series. Both the Dickey-Fuller test and the KPSS test showed strong evidence 
of a unit root in the series. Even the differenced follower count, however, still possessed residual 
auto-regression, thus we utilized Prais-Winsten regression. 
5. We also tested the models with only accounts for which we obtained CAP_Universal scores, 
i.e., excluding suspended and protected accounts; the results are nearly identical. 
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Table 1. Results of bot detection process using Botometer and Twitter.  
 
 
 
Bot likely 
(CAP_ 
Universal 
>.25) 
Bot 
unlikely 
(CAP_ 
Universal 
<=.25) 
Page 
doesn’t 
exist 
Protected Suspended NA Total 
IDs retweeting 
Trump once 
4619 
(4.46%) 
70156 
(67.67%) 
11671 
(11.26%) 
6216 
(6.00%) 
10112 
(9.75%) 
905 
(0.87%) 
103679 
(100%) 
IDs retweeting 
Trump more 
than once 
 
1597 
(4.29%) 
 
26676 
(71.70%) 
3892 
(10.46%) 
1493 
(4.01%) 
3455 
(9.29%) 
90 
(0.24%) 
37203 
(100%) 
Total  6216 96832 15563 7709 13567 995 140822 
Note. Entries represent number of accounts in each category and percentages of horizontal total. 
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Table 2. Prais-Winsten regression models predicting daily change in Trump followers on Twitter 
during the primary and general election periods. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Follower Countt+1 Follower Countt+1 Follower Countt+1 
    
Trump Campaign Event 338.90 185.54 -246.05 
 (414.41) (370.59) (360.23) 
Election Event 8,159.14** 5,503.39** 5,127.25** 
 (1,736.72) (1,602.57) (1,568.59) 
Outrageous Statement 3,136.76# 1,637.64 1,546.40 
 (1,764.88) (1,620.31) (1,587.50) 
Trump Retweets  14.21** 10.14** 
  (1.16) (1.17) 
General Trump News   -8.88 
   (65.14) 
Trump Twitter News   2,167.26** 
   (320.00) 
Constant 18,457.73** 11,003.04** 7,563.94** 
 (1,297.95) (1,167.16) (1,159.58) 
    
Observations 510 510 510 
R-squared 0.05 0.27 0.37 
Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses;  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p <0.1 
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Table 3. Prais-Winsten regression models predicting daily change in Trump followers on Twitter, disaggregated according to bot 
detection results.  
 Original model Non-bots Bots Full series, no 
interpolation 
Variables Follower Countt+1 Follower Countt+1 Follower Countt+1 Follower Countt+1 
     
Trump Campaign Event -246.05 -281.53 -345.84 -252.39 
 (360.23) (366.56) (377.06) (374.36) 
Election Event 5,127.25** 4,893.62** 6,144.00** 2,817.86# 
 (1,568.59) (1,615.42) (1,630.42) (1,607.17) 
Outrageous Statement 1,546.40 1,211.38 2,315.81 2,290.30 
 (1,587.50) (1,636.85) (1,651.75) (1,638.30) 
All RTs 
 
RTs by not-bots + 
protected 
10.14** 
(1.17)  
10.36** 
(1.40) 
 10.37** 
(1.19) 
 
RTs by bots + suspended 
 
   
39.34** 
(7.89) 
 
General Trump News -8.88 16.46 42.77 -6.98 
 (65.14) (65.46) (68.12) (67.21) 
Trump Twitter News 2,167.26** 2,277.31** 2,588.37** 2076.07** 
 (320.00) (324.51) (328.92) (335.99) 
Constant 7,563.94** 7,858.12** 7,885.49** 7808.85 
 (1,159.58) (1,137.83) (1,244.08) (1242.24) 
     
Observations 510 510 510 463 
R-squared 0.37 0.36 0.31 0.36 
Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses;  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Note. The first three columns display results of regressions using three series of Trump retweets: (1) all retweets in our sample, (2) 
retweets coming from likely non-bots, and (3) retweets coming from likely bots. The fourth column displays results of all retweets 
series, with interpolated datapoints left out.
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Figure 1. Daily count of Trump's Twitter followers, June 2015-December 2016. 
  
Figure 2. Daily percentage growth in Trump’s Twitter followers, June 2015-December 2016. 
Note. Annotations indicate 10 days of greatest growth. 
